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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

MEREDITH PAGE and MAURINE S.
PAGE,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
FEDERAL SECURITY INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

Case No.
8815

Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Defendant and Appellant

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was brought in the Third Judicial District of
the State of Utah by the plaintiffs-respondents against the
defendant-appellant, Federal Security Insurance Company,
seeking to recover the face amount of an insurance policy in
the amount of $11,682.00, which policy was issued by the
defendant on the life of Alma M. Page on the 15th day of

5
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December, 1950, with Meredith Page, father of the insured
and one of the plaintiffs herein, named as beneficiary thereon,
the insured, Alma M. Page, having died on or about the 14th
day of August, 1956.
The defendant-appellant filed its answer alleging that the
insured, Alma M. Page, prior to his death, elected under the
terms of the policy, "Option (B) Reduced Paid-Up Life Insurance", in the sum of $1443.00.
The matter was heard by the court, sitting with a jury. At
the close of plaintiffs' evidence, the defendant made a motion
for a directed verdict, which motion was denied by the court.
On the 12th day of December, 1957, the jury found in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendant.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a motion for a
new trial, which motions were, on the 3rd day of January,
1958, denied by the court.
On the 14th day of January, 1958, notice of appeal was
filed and served by the defendant-appellant, and the cause is
now before the court for review.
This action arose from the following transactions, to-wit:
Alma M. Page, on the 6th day of December, 1950, made
an application in writing to the Federal Security Insurance
Company for an insurance policy ~nown and designated as
"Bonus Policy, Participating 20 Payment Life" in the face
amount of $11,682.00, which policy was issued on the 15th day
of December, 1950.
6
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The insured was then 24 years of age and unmarried, but
on or about the 24th day of February, 1954, he was married to
Ruth Jensen, now surviving him. The references made throughout this brief to "Ruth Jensen Page" are to the widow of the
insured.
The premium on the policy of insurance was $400.00 a
year, payable on the 15th day of December, each and every
year. The premiums were paid on said policy, either by cash
or policy loan, from 1950 through December 15, 1954, thus
keeping the policy in force until December 15, 1955.
The policy in question is profit sharing, the insured being
entitled to dividends at the end of the second year, as provided
in the rider attached to said policy, and likewise provides for
cash values.
Mr. Erich Olschewski, referred to hereafter as "Erich"
or "Mr. Olschewski," was, at the times mentioned herein, the
assistant secretary of the defendant, Federal Security Insurance
Company.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. Did the insured, Alma M. Page, prior to his death,

deliver his insurance policy to the company?
2. As the policy of insurance does not require the exercising
of the options under the non-forfeiture provisions of the policy
to be in writing, an oral election is sufficient under the law to
effectuate a valid election.
3. Did the insured intend to elect one of the options under
the non-forfeiture provisions of the policy, prior to his death?
7
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4. Did the insured, Alma M. Page, prior to his death, elect
"Option (B) Reduced Paid-Up Life Insurance," under the
non-forfeiture provisions of the policy in question?
5. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for
a directed verdict.

6. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

7. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for
a new trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DID THE INSURED, ALMA M. PAGE, PRIOR TO HIS
DEATH, DELIVER HIS INSURANCE POLICY TO THE
COMPANY?
The testimony of Ruth Jensen Page, widow of the insured,
and of other witnesses established that the insured and
his wife on two occasions visited the home office of the defendant company, Federal Security Insurance Company. The
testimony of Ruth Jensen Page clearly points out that her hus·
band, during his lifetime, did deliver to the defendant his life
insurance policy.
In speaking of the second visit made by herself and her
husband to the company offices, Mrs. Page testified:

"Q. A paid-up insurance. Now while you were there,
did you have the insurance policy with you?
A. Back home?

8
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Q. No, at the office?
A. Yes. We had it with us.

Q. You had it, and what did you do with it?
A. Erich kept it as far as I remember."

R. 24
Defendant's Exhibit No. 10, a letter obtained from Ruth
Jensen Page at the time her deposition was taken, and introduced into evidence at the trial, states without . qualification
the whereabouts of the policy of insurance on the 3rd day of
August, 1955. This exhibit is set forth in full on pages 35 & 36
of this brief. The last paragraph states:
"We shall continue to hold your policy in our possession until we hear from you."
Def's Exhibit No. 10, Ltr
dtd Aug. 3, 1955, from
Defendant to Alma M. Page
Under direct examination, Mr. Erich Olschewski, in ~peak
ing of the visits made to the company offices by the insured
and his wife, testified:

"Q. What did you talk about?
A. As a result of this letter, I might first of all state
they had left the policy with me and asked me to
give them a letter explaining the various things I
recommended for them and upon receipt of that
letter in due time, they came back to give me their
decision.''
R. 37
In the direct examination of Mr. Olschewski with regard
to Exhibit No. 10, the record shows:

9
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"Q. Now, I show you what has been marked as defendant's Exhibit 10 and ask you whether you have ever
seen that before?
A. Would you restate that please?

Q. I was asking you if you have ever seen it before?
A. Yes.

Q. Does it bear your signature?
A. Yes, it does.

Q. Do you know who dictated the letter?
A. I did.
Q. After you dictated it, what did you do?
MR. COTRO MANES:
mailed and received?

Will you stipulate that it

MR. RONNOW: Yes."
R. 36
Defendant's Exhibit No. 12, which was introduced into
evidence, and which is set forth in full on page 37 of this
brief, again states that the defendant had in its possession the
insurance policy of Alma M. Page. The first paragraph of this
exhibit, the carbon copy of a letter from the defendant to
Alma M. Page, states:
··In accordance with your election when in the office
on August 8, we return herewith your policy No. 20

PLB 3lOL"

Defs Exhibit No. 12, Ltr
dtd Aug. 15, 1955, from
Defendant to Alma M. Page

The insurance policy mentioned by number in this exhibit
10
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is the same numbered policy as the one introduced by the plain~
tiffs as Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 1.
The testimony of Ruth Jensen Page, with regard to the
return of the insurance policy by the defendant to herself and
her husband, shows:

"Q. Now, after the insurance policy came back from
the insurance company,
MR. BUSHNELL: It has not been established whether
the policy came back from the insurance company.
A. The policy came back.
MR. BUSHNELL: I withdraw my objection."
R.27

The testimony of Merle Thomas Olschewski, Erich Olschewski' s secretary at the time in question, shows that she had
the policy in her possession and affixed thereto the rider re~
clueing the policy to paid-up life insurance, and mailed it back
to the insured.

"Q. I show you what has been received into evidence,
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, and ask you to examine it and
say whether you have ever seen it before?
A. Yes, I have.

Q. Did you attach, then, the rider to that policy?
A. Yes, I did.

Q. What did you do then?
A. Mailed it to Mr. Page together with the letter of
Mr. Olschewski."

R. 86
11
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The only evidence introduced by the plaintiffs to reb1
the fact that the deceased Alma M. Page surrendered his poli,
to the insurance company for endorsement was the testimon
of the plaintiff, Meredith M. Page, who, under cross examim
tion, testified:

"Q. All right, you stated a minute ago that you have,
strong box at your home, is that correct?
A. Yes.

Q. And that the policy has been inside that box ever
since it was issued?
A. That is right.

Q. All this time the policy was in this box?

A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever give it to your son?
A. I have never given it to my son."

R. 102
Considering Defendant's Exhibits 10 and 12, the testi·
mony of the insured's widow, Ruth Jensen Page, and the testi·
mony of the defendant's employees, Mr. and Mrs. Olschewski,
there is an overwhelming preponderance of evidence that this
policy was in fact delivered to the insurance company by the
insured and likewise that it was returned by the company to
the insured.
These facts were not controverted. The plaintiffs at no
time alleged or plead that Exhibits 10 or 12 were fraudulent.
··Fraud is a matter to be established by clear and
12
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convincing proof . . . Its existence should never rest
upon mere suspicion or surmise."
Shaw v. Board of Education,
38 N. M. 298, 31 P. 2d 993,
93 A. L. R. 432, 439.
"Where fraud is charged, it must affirmatively be
proved by clear and convincing testimony. It cannot
be established upon mere suspicion."
Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire
Ins. Co., 359 Ill. 584, 195 N. E. 420,
98 A.L.R. 169, 180
(Emphasis supplied)
The plaintiffs did not object to the introduction of Exhibit
(R. 90). They did object to the introduction of Exhibit
12 on the grounds that it was not shown that the letter was
ever received by Alma M. Page. The court ruled that this was
correct, but allowed the exhibit to be introduced (R. 87).
10

It is contended that the testimony of Ruth Jensen Page,
widow of the insured, did show that the letter had in fact
been received.
"Q. I'll show you what has been marked defendant's
Exhibit 12 and ask you to read that and tell me
whether or not you have ever seen the original of
that letter?

A. I'm afraid I didn't read it too well if we did get it.

Q. Well, did you ever see a letter like that?
A. Do I have to say yes or no?

Q. Yes, if you did see it or didn't we want the truth.
A. I think it was something like it I was reading."
R. 72

13
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On cross examination by plaintiff's counsel, Mrs. Page
testified:

"Q. Do you remember honestly reading or receiving
the Exhibit which is marked No. 12?
A. As I said, not the wordings, but I remember talking
that it was fixed the way we wanted it when the
policy came back.

Q. Do you recall whether you said you read it or did
your husband read it?

A. I believe we read it together."
R. 29
Mrs. Merle Olschewski testified that she transcribed
Exhibit 12 from her shorthand notes, typed it on letterhead
stationery, gave it to Mr. Olschewski for signing, and thereafter placed the letter in the envelope with the policy of
insurance, sealed the letter in the envelope with the policy
of insurance, stamped the envelope and mailed it to the insured,
Alma M. Page, (R. 85, 86). She was not cross-examined by
plaintiffs' counsel.
"It is generally recognized that a presumption of
the due receipt of a letter or of a communication
through the mails arises upon proof that such letter
or communication properly addressed to the addressee
and properly stamped with sufficient postage thereon
was mailed . . . ''
20 Am Jur 196, Evidence, Sec. 196,
citing Utah case of Campbell v.
Gowans, 25 U. 268, 100 P. 397.
With the exception of the statement by Mr. Meredith

14
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Page, one of the plaintiffs herein, to the effect that he never
gave his son, Alma Page, the insured, the insurance policy
and that the policy was in•the strong box continuously from
the time it was issued until after his son's death, all evidence
showed that the policy was in fact possessed by the insured,
Alma M. Page, who left it at the company offices with Mr.
Olschewski. Three witnesses and two written documents
substantiate this fact, as opposed to the statement of the plaintiff, Meredith.
"While a jury may not arbitrarily disbelieve a witness
and reject his testimony, neither are they bound to accept a fact as established merely because he testifies
to it, when the circumstances render its existence, or
the testimony of the witness, improbable or doubtful."
Leavitt v. Thurston,
38 U. 351, 113 P. 77.
" ... the documentary proof, if inconsistent with the
oral testimony, is controlling ... "
Sachs v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co.,
148 F. 2d 128 (7th Cir. 1945).

POINT TWO
AS THE POLICY OF INSURANCE DOES NOT REQUIRE THE EXERCISING OF THE OPTIONS UNDER
THE NON-FORFEITURE PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY
TO BE IN WRITING, AN ORAL ELECTION IS SUFFICIENT UNDER THE LAW TO EFFECTUATE A VALID
ELECTION.
The insurance policy m question, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1,
l5
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specifically spells out the necessity of written requests by the
insured to effectuate certain changes under the policy,. that is:
(a) change of beneficiary, (b) request for automatic premium
loan privilege, (c) revocation of automatic premium loan
privilege.
The contract is silent as to the necessity of a written
request for the election of any of the options known as Options
A, B, and C. Thus, where the contract is silent as to· the necessity of a written election, the court cannot insert or read· into
the option provision the word, ''written.''
''An insurance contract must be construed without
disregarding words or clauses used, or inserting words
or clauses not used."
29 Am Jur 173, Insurance, Sec. 157
"The court has no power to interpolate into the
agreement between an insurer and the insured a condition or stipulation not contemplated either by law
or by the contract between the parties."
29 Am Jur 173, 174
Insurance, Sec. 15 7
The contract of insurance is not ambiguous and therefore
the courts are bound to interpret it as written.
·· . . . and as there is no ambiguity in the contract,
it must be given effect as written. As has often been
said, 'Courts are without authority to rewrite contracts'." Citing cases.
Summers v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
109 F. 2d 845 (8th cir. 1940)
127 A.L.R. 1336.
The options given the insured are for his benefit and the
16
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exercising of the options are with him; and where it is not
required that written acceptance of the option be made, then
in that event an oral acceptance is sufficient.
" . . . a verbal acceptance of an option is sufficient
when the option does not require a written acceptance."
12 Am Jur 534, Contracts, Sec. 39

POINT THREE
DID THE INSURED INTEND TO ELECT ONE OF
THE OPTIONS UNDER THE NON-FORFEITURE PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY, PRIOR TO HIS DEATH?
The testimony of the widow, Ruth Jensen Page, established
that the motive of the insured and herself in going to the
insurance company offices was to discontinue the policy as a
$400.00 per year premium payable insurance contract. On
direct examination in regard to the visits made to the company
offices by herself and the insured, Mrs. Page testified:

"Q. What did you and your husband go there for?
A. To have our policy discontinued.

Q. To have your policy discontinued?
A. We didn't want it any more. We wanted it as a paid
up insurance."
R. 21
On cross-examination regarding these visits to the company offices, Mrs. Page testified:

"Q. Let me ask you, did I understand your testimony
correctly-you went in and arranged so that you
would not have to make any more payments?
17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A. We were worried because we had borrowed on it
and we had enough to do with payments on the
farm, and we couldn't see how we could make such
a payment.

Q. Then, the purpose for going in was to stop making
payments?

A. We couldn't make any payments.
Q. You wanted to make arrangements so that you
wouldn't have to make any further payments?
A.

Yes:·
R. 30

Mr. Erich Olschewski, on direct examination, testified:

"Q. In connection with this policy, did you have occasion during the year of 195 5 to see Alma M. Page
at your office?

A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall what month it was?
A. August.
Q. And who was with him?

A. His wife."
R. 35
At this point it is important to recognize that this policy
was paid by a single premium each year of $400.00 (R. 46),
payable on the anniversary date of the policy which was December 15 of each year (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). The premium
due on December 15, 1954, had been paid by a policy loan
and the policy was in full force and effect with no additional
premium due until December 15, 1955 (R. 54), which date
was over four months in the future from the time of the con·
18
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versations testified to by Ruth Jensen Page and Mr. Olschewski,
and corroborated by Exhibits 3, 4, 10 and 12.
Defendant's Exhibit 10 corroborates the testimony of
Ruth Jenesn Page in regard to the desire of her husband, the
insured, to apply for one of the options available to him
under the policy.
"I have looked into the matter discussed as to the
alternatives available and advisable in applying the
non-forfeiture values of your policy.
"Again I'm sorry that you feel that you are unable to
continue with this full program."
Defendant's Exhibit No. 10
Ltr, dtd Aug. 3, 195 5, from
Defendant to Insured.
The evidence was uncontroverted that the insured, Alma
M. Page, went to the insurance company offices of his own
free will four months prior to the expiration of his policy of
insurance. The evidence and testimony established beyond a
reasonable doubt that his motive in going there was to do
something about his insurance policy. From the evidence adduced the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the insured
intended to elect one of the three options available under his
policy of insurance.

POINT FOUR
DID THE INSURED, ALMA M. PAGE, PRIOR TO
HIS DEATH, ELECT "OPTION (B) REDUCED PAID-UP
LIFE INSURANCE," UNDER THE NON-FORFEITURE
PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY IN QUESTION?
19
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The evidence introduced in this matter established, and
was not controverted, that the insured and his wife, Ruth
Jensen Page, visited the office of the insurance company shortly
prior to August 3rd, 1955, and again on the 8th day of August,
1955 (R. 20, 21, 35, 37, and Defendant's Exhibits 10 and 12).
It is important to note that the testimony of the insured's
widow, Ruth Jensen Page, while uncertain as to the unimportant
details (unimportant, at least, to the insured and his wife at
the time of the transaction) , is positive as to what the insured
decided to do with regard to the election of one of the options
available to him under the provisions of the policy.
The plaintiffs attempted to capitalize upon these uncertainties in her testimony, but it should be remembered that
over two years had elapsed between the time the visits were
made to the offices. of the defendant insurance company and
the election made of one of the options and the time her
testimony was given. The uncertainty as to detail is only normal
and lends itself to the belief of her testimony. How many of
us can recall the details of transactions two years old?
Ruth Jensen Page testified:

"Q. Now, after you received this letter, did you and
your husband discuss about the life insurance?"
(The letter referred to is Defendant's Exhibit 10,
Ltr Dated August 3rd, 1955.)
"A. Yes.
Q. And what did you do afterward, if anything?

A. We decided on the paid-up insurance."
R. 23
20
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"Q. This gentleman here? And do you recall what was
said at that time to Erich?" (Referring to the second visit made by the insured and Mrs. Page to the
company offices.)
"THE COURT: That calls for a yes or no answer.
A. Yes.

Q. Well, what was it?
A. Can I answer it?

Q: You don't have to give us word for word, just the
substance as far as you can remember. What recollection you have as to what your husband and you
said?
A. We just told him what we wanted and he still tried
to ask us to stay on, but ...

Q. What did you say you wanted?
A. A paid up insurance.

Q. A paid up insurance ... "
R. 24

"Q. Now, will you tell us what you received from the
Insurance Company through the mails?
A. I said I thought we received a piece of paper with
the insurance saying that it was paid up insurance."
R. 25

"Q. Did you and your husband talk about it, the insurance policy, after it came back from the Insurance Company?
A. No, I don't think so.

Q. At no time?
A. I saw the paper that I thought was with it. I don't
know if it was attached.
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Q. Where was the paper which you saw?
A. With the insurance when it came back."

R. 26

"Q. Now, after this policy came back, did you and
your husband discuss the insurance policy?
A. No, not after it was fixed the way we wanted it."
R. 27
On cross-examination, Ruth Jensen Page testified:

"Q. Do you remember honestly reading or receiving
the exhibit which is marked No. 12?
A. As I said, not the ~ordings, but I remember talking
that it was fixed the way we wanted it when the
policy came back.''
R. 29

"Q. Can you explain the ways which Mr. Olschewski
arranged the policy so that you wouldn't have to
make any more payments?
A. No, I'm not quite sure. I know that we decided to
take the paid up insurance. I can't recall the different ways.''
R. 31
The witness, Ruth Jensen Page, was asked one question
on re-direct examination:

"Q. Mrs. Page, do you remember the amount of msurance on the paid-up insurance policy?
A. One thousand four hundred something."
R. 32
The testimony of Ruth Jensen Page was never impeached
by either her own testimony or by the testimony of any other
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witness. She stands as an independent and disinterested party
who has nothing to gain or lose in this law suit; and, as the
person who was closest to the deceased insured, certainly
knows what transpired and what the insured elected to do.
The plaintiffs never did discredit the honesty or veracity of
this witness. Her testimony, while uncertain as to detail, stands
firm and positive as to the elected option of the deceased
insured.
"Though a witness is uncertain as to either the observation or the recollection of a fact concerning which
he is asked to testify, and gives his testimony qualified
by a phrase or phrases expressive of something less
than a positive degree of assurance, the admissibility
of his evidence is not affected thereby."
4 A.L.R. 979, annotation,
Citing cases
"Generally, testimony given by a disinterested witness, who is in no way discredited by other evidence,
to a fact within his own knowledge, which is not in
itself improbable or in conflict with other evidence, is
to be believed; and in many cases it is said that the
facts so given are to be taken as legally established."
20 Am Jur 1030, Evidence,
Sec. 1180, citing cases.
Sec. 8 A.L.R. 796 annotation
Jones, Commentaries on evidence,
Vol. 6, P. 4887, Sec. 2467
"Unless the witness is impeached or his testimony is
against the ordinary and usual course of nature, or for
some other adequate reason is clearly not worthy of
belief, the courts are bound to consider it in arriving
at their conclusions."
Utah Commercial & Savings Bank v. Fox,
44 U. 323, 140 P. 660, 663.
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·'While juries are given great latitude in deducing
inferences from established facts, they, n~vertheless,
are not permitted to base an inference upon an inference. Nor may they, without any reason overturn legal
presumptions or arbitrarily disregard the positive statements of witnesses . . . If juries were permitted to do
that, then court trials and the rules of evidence would
become a mere delusion and a snare."
Karren v. Blair, 63 U 344
225 P. 1094, 1096
"Under usual circumstances uncontroverted testimony of credible witnesses may not arbitrarily be disregarded by the trier of facts."
Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co.,
5 U. 2d 187, 299 P. 2d 622.
"However, where facts are proved by uncontroverted
testimony of competent disinterested witnesses and
there is nothing inherently unreasonable nor any circumstances which would tend to raise doubt of its
truth, it should be taken as established. Refusal to do
so is an arbitrary disregard by the trier of the facts."
Citing authority.
Jones v. California Packing Corp.,
121 U. 612, 244 P. 2d 640.
Defendant's Exhibit 12 was never directly assailed as being
fraudulent nor as having been written at a later date than as
shown on the letter.
Defendant's Exhibit 3, which was received in evidence,
states, in the handwriting of Mr. Erich Olschewski:
"8-8-55 - Elected Paid-Up for $1443.00."
Def's Exhibit 3,
Policy Data Sheet from
Records of Defendant company
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Mr. Olschewski testified that he placed this wntmg on
the sheet, or card, at the time that the insured and his . Yiife
were in his office on the 8th day of August, 195 5, and elected
to take the paid-up insurance (R. 39) . He further testified
that the notation in red pencil, "Reduced Paid-Up," which
appears on this card was likewise placed thereon by him at this
time (R. 40), and that the red penciled notation, "Reduced
Paid-Up," which appears on Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 4,
the premium record card and the dividend record card, respectively, kept by the defendant with regard to the policy
in question, were made by him at that time (R. 40, 41) .
Defendant's Exhibit 4, the dividend record card, shows
the dividends, both bonus and participating, which were paid
on this policy. It is to be noted that prior to the dividend payment made on December 15, 1955, none of the bonus dividends
or participating dividends were ever less than $20.00. The last
two bonus dividends were for $48.99 and $56.00, respectively,
and the participating dividend paid December 15, 1954, was
for $36.33.
Defendant's Exhibit 9, a dividend check made payable to
the insured, Alma M. Page, dated December 22, 1955, and
showing endorsements and clearing house stamps dated January 11, 1956, shows that the amount paid for participating
dividends in the year 1955 was only $4.75.
During the years 1950 through 1954, the face amount
of the policy was $11,682.00. However, prior to the anniversary
of the policy in December of 1955, defendant contends, the
policy was reduced in face amount to only $1,443.00, thus
accounting for the reduction in participating dividend from
25
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$36.33 paid December 15, 1954, to $4.75 paid December 15,
1955.
The dividend check for $4.75, Defendant's Exhibit 9, was
notice to Alma M. Page of the change in the face amount of
his policy, and the fact that the insured accepted the check
and did not contest the obviously drastic reduction in dividends
shows that he well knew of the reduction in the face amount
of his policy.
"But when insured was, after repeated notice, in·
formed that the policy had been indorsed for $1,955.00
term insurance and the length of that term and of this
application of the dividends accrued he took no steps
to indicate any dissent or objection to what had been
done . . . This brings up the question whether he did
not consent to or acquiese in, all that is involved in the
indorsement on the policy. We think it should be said
that he did.''
Dougherty v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
of N.Y., (226 MA 570) 44 S.W. 2d 206.
Cited with approval in Scutten v.
Metro Life Ins. Co., 68 S.W. 2d 60,
retrial, 81 S.W. 2d 313.
The plaintiffs attempted at great length to discredit Defendant's Exhibit No. 3. the policy data sheet, as being contradictory of other exhibits and of what the company did with
regard to the election made by the insured. Plaintiffs' counsel
pointed out that the notation, "Lapsed 9-16-55," on the bottom
of Exhibit No. 3, was contrary to the notation, "8-8-55 Elected
Paid-Up for $1443.00,'' appearing in the upper portion of
the exhibit and to defendant's proposed Exhibit 6, a report
to the reinsurance company, wherein it is shown that the Page
26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

policy lapsed on "7-15-55." An examination of Exhibit 6 shows
that the date of this report is September 16, 1955, the same
date appearing on the bottom of Exhibit 3.
In regard to the report to the reinsurance company, the
proposed Exhibit 6, Mr. Olschewski testified:
"THE COURT: ... Ask him if he can explain why the
word 'lapsed' was used.

Q. Can you?
A. Yes. To notify them to discontinue his reinsurance
premium payments.

Q. All right. And that is the meaning of the word
'lapsed' as far as this report is concerned?
A. Yes."

R. 71, 72
Plaintiffs attempted to confuse the jury by trying to show
inconsistencies in the defendant's records introduced as exhibits,
but the testimony of the defendant's secretary, Mr. Olschewski,
explained the entries. The court erred in not allowing the
introduction of Defendant's Exhibit No. 6, on the grounds that
this exhibit explained entries on Exhibit No. 3.

POINT FIVE
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.
Under Rule 50, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is permitted for either party to an action to move for a directed
verdict upon the close of the evidence offered by the opponent.
27
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Upon the close of plaintiffs' evidence, the defendant moved
the court for a directed verdict (R. 115) on the grounds that
as a matter of law, as the defendant had met the burden of
proof and the plaintiffs had not introduced competent evidence
to rebut defendant's evidence, there was no question of fact
to be decided by the jury and any deliberation by them would
be speculative in nature.
The defendant had established beyond any doubt the
insured's election of one of the options contained in the policy
of insurance. As a matter of law, this election fixed the rights
of the parties.
·'The offer is contained in the policy contract, and
is from the company to the insured; the option is in
the insured and not the company, and his acceptance
completes the contract; the company has no right to
accept or reject; its obligation to pay is absolute ...
The cases, as far as we are advised, are at one in holding that the rights of the parties are fixed when an
option given by a policy is exercised by the insured."
Pacific States Life Ins. Co. v.
Bryce, 67 F. 2d 710 (lOth Cir.
1933) 91 A.L.R. 1446.
The above case cites the case of Lipman v. Equitable Life
Assur. Society, 58 F. 2d 15, 18 (4th Cir. 1932), wherein the
Court stated:
·'Since the insured had the option to surrender her

policy and take the cash surrender value on October
1Oth, there can be no question but that the rights of
the parties became fixed and insured became entitled
to the cash surrender value, and nothing more, when
she exercised the option. It was not necessary that
defendant do anything. There was a meeting of the
28
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minds of the parties when the insured accepted the
continuing offer of the company evidenced by the

option.''
The election by the insured of the option made the instant
case a matter of law and not a matter of fact for the jury to
speculate upon. The court acknowledged this by its Instruction
No. 8, wherein it instructed the jury:
"You are instructed that delivery of the policy of
insurance to the insurance company by the insured,
with request that it issue to him a reduced paid-up life
insurance policy constitutes an election."
As set forth in Points 1, 3, and 4 of this brief, the evidence
established that the insured did surrender his policy, did request
information about the options, and did elect "Reduced PaidUp" insurance.
Barron and Holtzoff, in their work, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Vol. 2, p. 754, Sec. 1071, said:
"It is a well established principle of the common
law that although questions of fact must be decided
by the jury and may not be reexamined by the court,
the question whether there is sufficient evidence to
raise a question of fact to be presented to the jury is
a question of law to be decided by the court."

In the case now before the court, the plaintiffs introduced
no evidence by testimony or otherwise which directly rebutted
defendant's evidence that the insured did in fact deliver his
policy to the company and did elect to take "Reduced Paid-Up"
insurance.
"Where the evidence upon any issue is all on one
side or so overwhelming on one side as to leave no
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room for doubt what the fact is, the court should give
a preemptory instruction to the jury." Citing cases.
Coen v. American Surety Co. of N. Y.,
120 F. 2d 393 (8th Cir. 1941).
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain,
288 U.S. 333, 53 S. Ct. 391,
77 L. Ed. 819.
"In the Federal courts where the evidence in favor
of one party is so overwhelming that the judge in the
exercise of sound discretion would be obliged to grant
a new trial if the jury rendered a verdict in favor of
the other party, it is his duty to direct a verdict." Citing
cases of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S.
333, 53 S. Ct. 391, 77 L. Ed 819; Daroca v. Metropolitan Life Ins Co., et al, CCA 5th, 121 F. 2d 919.
" . . . the rule of practice to the effect that a mere
scintella of evidence is sufficient to require submission
to the jury has never obtained in the Federal Courts."
White v. New York Life Ins Co.,
145 F. 2d 504 (5th Cir. 1944).

POINT SIX
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
The defendant moved the court for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, a motion for a new
trial (R. 125). Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure such
a motion is proper, and the court, while having denied a
motion for a directed verdict, may enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
30
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.. ' . . . that because the court cannot direct a verdict
one way, it may not set aside a verdict the other way
is erroneous. Indeed, as distinctly pointed out by Judge
Lurton, the mental process in deciding a motion to
direct a verdict is very different from that used in deciding a motion to set aside a verdict as against the
weight of evidence. In the former there is no weighing
of plaintiff's evidence with defendant's. It is only a
sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence to support a burden
ignoring defendant's evidence. In the latter it is
always a comparison of opposing proofs.' "
General America Life Ins. Co. v.
Central Nat'l Bank, 136 F. 2d 821, 823
(6th Cir. 1943), Citing Felton v. Spiro,
78 F. 2d 576,582 (6th Cir. 1897).
Barron and Holtzoff in their work, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Vol. 2, p. 774, Sec. 1079, have stated:
"The court has power to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict only for one reason-the absence
of any substantial evidence to sup_port the verdict.''
The annotation on "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict," found in United States Supreme Court Reports,
85 L. Ed. 155, 311 U.S., gives the background and basis for
such a motion.
In the case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122
F. 2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941), the court goes into the historical
background and examines many of the cases on the subject.
The court ruled:
"In such a motion" (to set aside the verdict) "it is
the duty of the judge to set aside the verdict and grant
a new trial if he is of opinion that the verdict is against
the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon
31
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evidence which is false, or will result in a miscarriage
of justice even though there may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict."
In the instant case, the weight of the evidence was overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant, and on the basis of
this weight the court properly should have granted defendant's
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The court, in its instruction No. 9, stated:
"The burden is upon the defendant insurance company to prove to your satisfaction by a preponderance
of the evidence, that at about the time indicated above
in this instruction, the insured, Alma M. Page, did
elect to change the policy referred to in paragraph
one of this instruction, that he notified the insurance
company of such election, and that the company did
make the change in the policy . . . ''
The defendant, as shown in Points No. 1, 3 and 4, did
overwhelmingly prove all of the elements enumerated in this
instruction.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in the case of
Bentley v. Brossard et al, 33 U. 396, 94 P. 737, held:
"Instructions to a jury are the law of the case, which
the jury must follow whether the instructions are in
fact correct; and, where a verdict is in disregard of
instructions, it should be set aside by the trial court."

POINT SEVEN
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
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The defendant made a motion for a new trial _in the
alternative to its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (R. 125 ), and stated the grounds for the motion.
Cir.

In the case of Garrison v. United States, 62 F. 2d 41 (4th
) the court pointed out:
"Verdict may be set aside and new trial granted,
when the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of
the evidence, or whenever in the exercise of sound
discretion the trial judge thinks this action necessary
to prevent a miscarriage of justice."

In the case now before the· court, the clear weight of the
evidence favored the defendant and upon the court's decision
not to grant a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, it should have granted a new trial. The refusal
to do so was error and an abuse of the court's sound discretion.

CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs, by introducing the policy of insurance on
the life of the deceased insured, with no rider attached to the
policy showing that the policy had been reduced to paid-up
life insurance established a prima facie case, and the burden
fell upon the defendant to prove that the insured had, prior
to his death in 1956, elected the option of reduced paid-up
insurance.
The defendant successfully met this burden and established, by not only a preponderance of evidence but by the
overwhelming weight of the evidence, that the insured had,
prior to his death, (a) intended to elect one of the options
33
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under the non-forfeiture provisions of the policy, (b) delivered
his insurance policy to the defendant insurance company, and
(c) elected "Option (B) Reduced Paid-Up Life Insurance"
under the non-forfeiture provisions of the policy in question.
The testimony of Ruth Jensen Page, the widow of the
insured, the testimony of the defendant's employees, and the
documentary evidence introduced by the defendant established
the defendant's claim beyond a reasonable doubt; and therefore:
1. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for

a directed verdict, on the ground that the plaintiffs did not
introduce sufficient evidence rebutting defendant's evidence to
merit the submission of the matter to a jury.
2. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the ground that the
verdict was not in accordance with the weight of evidence.
3. The court erred in not granting defendant's motion for
a new trial, on the ground that a manifest injustice was done
by not giving defendant an opportunity to have this matter
heard before another jury.
On the basis of the evidence adduced at the trial, defendant
is entitled to judgment in its favor.
Respectfully submitted,
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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EXHIBIT 10
FEDERAL SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY
NEWHOUSE BUILDING
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
August 3, 1955
Mr. and Mrs. Alma M. Page
Riverton
Utah
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Page:
I have looked into the matter discussed as to the alternatives available and advisable in applying the non-forfeiture
values of your policy.
Again I'm sorry that you feel that you are unable to continue with this full program. As explained to you before, there
is a considerable forfeiture by discontinuing this contract at
this juncture. While if you see the program through, it will
prove very profitable to your investment besides the insurance
coverage. However, I assume that you are giving this your careful consideration.
One option available is the reduced paid-up insurance as
we discussed, and if this option is elected at this time, we can
offer you a paid-up policy for the amount of $1443.00.
Another choice is to reissue your policy in two separate
policies in such amounts as would make it convenient for you
to keep one of them in force and permit the other to lapse
with the privilege of reinstating it when convenient.
You may, of course, surrender your policy completely for
its present cash value. You have paid five annual premiums,
the last annual premium paid by a policy loan. The cash values
at the end of the fifth year, which will be December 15, 1955,
come to $71.00 per $1,000 face amount or a total of $829.42
minus the present loan against the policy of $421.05.
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Of these three propositions we recommend either of the
first two mentioned, and we hope to hear from you as to your
decision.
We remind you again that this policy is a very unusual and
exclusive Bonus Contract. I note that dividends have already
been totaling $210.45 which needless to say is a very liberal
and gratifying percentage, and which dividends would continue and undoubtedly increase yearly in proportion to the
premium amount continued.
We shall continue to hold your policy in our possession
until we hear from you.
Sincerely yours,

Is/ E. 0 lschewski
E. Olschewski
Assistant Secretary
EO/km
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EXHIBIT 12
August 15, 1955
Mr. Alma M. Page
Riverton, Utah
Dear Mr. Page:
In accordance with your election when in the office on
August 8, we return herewith your policy No. 20 PLB-3101.
Please note that we have attached thereto our endorsement
certifying that we have applied the Paid-Up Option for the face
amount of $1,443, being effective as of August 8, 1955.
Your contract is now fully paid-up and will not require
any further premium payments. Dividends will continue in
proportion to the reduced face amount as set forth in the provisions of the policy.
We hope that we may be able to serve you further in the
future.
Sincerely yours,
FEDERAL SECURITY INS. CO.
E. Olschewski
Assistant Secretary
EO/mrt
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